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WTO Jurisprudence & Its Critiques:
The Appellate Body’s Anti-Constitutional Resistance

William Magnuson
In a time of financial crisis and rising demand for economic protectionism, the World Trade
Organization, promoting free trade and economic growth, has never been more important.
Enforcement of the WTO’s provisions has grown increasingly contentious and high-stakes, and the
Appellate Body empowered to rule on violations of the treaty has received harsh criticism. Three
elements of WTO jurisprudence, in particular, stand out. First, the court’s excessive use of narrow
textualist argument tends to lead to short-sighted decisions that give little guidance to member states.
Second, the court’s decisions have increasingly interfered with sensitive democratic processes in sovereign
countries. Third, the opinions handed down by the court have led countries to adopt trade-restrictive,
rather than trade-liberalizing, measures. These criticisms of WTO jurisprudence present serious
challenges to the very raison d’être of the WTO. This jurisprudence cannot be explained without
reference to the AB’s history as an institution awkwardly positioned somewhere between the realm of
diplomacy and law. This Article will argue that the WTO’s jurisprudence can be usefully understood
as a kind of resistance to constitutionalization in international trade law. The narrow textualism of
the AB was intended to reduce the amount of contestation and politics at the WTO, but,
paradoxically, the AB’s resistance to constitutionalization has actually created the very controversy
and division that it seeks to avoid.
I. INTRODUCTION
The recent and ongoing financial crisis has illustrated just how central
international trade is to today’s globalized world. Unwise home lending practices in
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the United States have led to a worldwide slowdown, from North America to Europe
to Asia. As economies struggle to grow, states have turned more and more to
economic nationalism in response to citizens’ demands for protection. Economists
denounce economic protectionism, but it continues to attract proponents from a wide
array of domestic groups. At the same time, states are bound by international rules
governing the structure of international trade and preventing the most egregious
forms of economic protectionism, namely through the World Trade Organization
(WTO). These rules in effect limit the ability of states to adopt trade-restrictive
practices.
A major debate about the WTO, and international law in general, has focused
on the question of enforcement powers. The WTO’s enforcement powers rest in the
Dispute Settlement Body (DSB), which allows for aggrieved states to bring their
complaints before a Panel. The Panel has authority to address complaints that a state
has violated the WTO’s provisions, and losing parties may appeal the decision to the
Appellate Body (AB).
Criticism of the DSB has been vociferous and broad-based. Many of these
criticisms have dealt with the powers and competences of the body. This paper,
however, will focus on three of the major criticisms of the actual jurisprudence of the
body. First, the court’s excessive use of narrow textualist argument tends to lead to
short-sighted decisions that give little guidance. Second, the court’s decisions have
increasingly interfered with sensitive democratic processes in sovereign countries.
Third, the opinions handed down by the court have led countries to adopt traderestrictive, rather than trade-liberalizing, measures. Examples abound, but a
particularly exemplary case is Australia – Salmon, a 1998 AB decision.
In Australia – Salmon, the AB held that Australia’s prohibition of the
importation of raw salmon violated its treaty obligations. Australia had implemented
the ban due to worries about certain pathogens contained in the salmon. Canada
complained that if Australia were truly worried about those pathogens, it would also
have banned the importation of other foods that presented the same kinds of risks.
After the decision, Australia decided to broaden the ban to include a wide array of
other products, rather than to liberalize the importation of salmon.
In Australia – Salmon, then, the AB’s narrow textual reading of treaty
provisions led to a decision that interfered with sensitive domestic decisions about the
level of risk that a society was willing to accept. These issues cut to the very heart of
concepts of sovereignty. Additionally, the opinion did not force the violating country
to adopt trade-liberalizing policies. Instead, the losing party decided to maintain or
increase trade-restrictive policies, the very thing the WTO was created to prevent.
What explains these problematic characteristics of WTO jurisprudence? Why
has the DSB chosen to adopt the approach it has? How can states accept the AB’s
sweeping claims to power over such sensitive domestic issues? And why do states
permit losing parties to respond by raising barriers to trade rather than lowering
them? Each of these questions presents serious challenges to the very raison d’être of
the WTO. It is important to ask them because they call into question the
effectiveness, legitimacy and purpose of the WTO.
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Any attempt to explain the workings of the WTO today must begin with the
history of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the WTO’s
predecessor. Nations founded the GATT with the expectation it would be a
temporary organization. After World War II, the major powers sought a way to
rebuild the economic order, and the US proposed an International Trade
Organization (ITO) to oversee this system. However, because negotiations over the
ITO would take time, the US negotiated the GATT as a temporary organization to
structure trade talks. The GATT focused on lowering tariffs on imported goods, but
had only a skeletal institutional architecture. All decisions required unanimous
consent, and most provisions were aimed at allowing parties to come to mutually
acceptable agreements. The opinions of the DSB could be blocked by a single state,
including the losing party in the dispute.
At the time, this structure worked well. It was meant to be a temporary way
to facilitate open trade between states. The consensus among economists and political
scientists was that free trade would increase prosperity, create links of
interdependence, and generally dissuade states from considering launching another
war. No one thought that the GATT would last for much longer than it took to
reach agreement on the broader ITO. But talks over the ITO broke down, and the
GATT became the predominant forum for states to negotiate multilateral free trade
agreements.
When the GATT became the WTO in 1995, however, things changed. The
new agreement committed states to wide-ranging trade liberalization policies,
including in important domestic areas such as trade in services and health and safety
measures. The newly-created DSB also received decidedly strengthened powers: its
decisions were treated as binding unless countries (including the winning party)
unanimously voted to reject them.
The radical changes imposed upon the WTO did not result in a concomitant
adjustment in the AB’s jurisprudence, however. It continued to rely on narrow textual
readings of the treaties. In essence, it remained a diplomatic mediator of disputes,
rather than a court empowered to pronounce on the merits of a case. To some extent,
this made sense. The AB wanted to ensure its enduring role in the WTO, and any
shift in jurisprudential approach might have been seen as a power grab. It needed to
keep its constituents happy and maintain its legitimacy. At the same time, though, the
increased scope of the WTO’s acquis meant that even “conservative” opinions could
have drastic effects on the internal politics of member states. In addition, the new
world of internal (as opposed to external) barriers to trade made it easy for states to
adopt trade restrictive policies in response to an adverse ruling at the WTO. Indeed,
states intended to give the DSB its new powers precisely to increase the “bite” of
WTO provisions and prevent such backsliding by states. The tensions between the
new content of the WTO and the old style of the AB were, and are, evident.
To some extent, the issues facing the AB are endemic to courts in general.
After all, most courts face huge legitimacy issues when they are faced with decisions
that some believe belong in the political realm or that have a counter-majoritarian
element to them. These issues are only exacerbated within the AB, which does not
have the advantage of operating in a single nation, and thus has an even more
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attenuated democratic pedigree. In this setting, one might say that almost any AB
decision would be open to criticism. This article does not dispute this claim, but
rather intends to identify the root causes of the most problematic aspects of WTO
jurisprudence and the perhaps unforeseen consequences of the AB’s decisions.
The AB’s jurisprudence, in the end, reflects one of the most fundamental
debates in international trade scholarship: whether the WTO is a constitutional polity.
Scholars have articulated at least three models of WTO constitutionalism: constitution
as institutional architecture, constitution as normative commitment, and constitution
as judicial mediation. Jeffrey Dunoff has suggested that all of these models are
analytically deficient and that, in fact, they stem from anxieties about the status of
international law in the world today. The AB’s jurisprudence itself demonstrates the
same debate about the status and role of the DSB and the WTO in general.
WTO jurisprudence, then, can be usefully understood as a kind of resistance
to constitutionalization in international trade law. The narrow textualism of the AB
was intended to reduce the amount of contestation and politics at the WTO. But
paradoxically, the AB’s resistance to constitutionalization has actually created the very
controversy and division that it seeks to avoid.
This paper will proceed in five parts. Part II will describe the major critiques
of WTO jurisprudence. It will highlight the AB’s textualism, its interference in
democracy, and its trade-restrictive consequences. Part III will focus on one of the
most important cases in recent years, Australia – Salmon. It will conclude that Australia
– Salmon is a case that demonstrates the full extent of the paradoxes inherent in WTO
jurisprudence. Part IV will discuss the history of the WTO and the AB. It will argue
that the AB’s awkward position somewhere between diplomacy and law has
contributed to the distortion of its case law. Part V will place WTO jurisprudence
within the larger context of the debate about constitutionalism in international trade
law. It will conclude that the AB’s jurisprudence represents a kind of resistance to
constitutionalization, but that this resistance has given rise to the politics and
controversy that it was intended to prevent.
II. ASPECTS OF WTO JURISPRUDENCE
A. Textualism Run Amok
One of the most striking characteristics of WTO jurisprudence is its
excessive use of narrow textualist interpretations of trade law. Even the most casual
perusal of a decision by the AB (the WTO’s highest court)1 will uncover an at-first
1 The WTO does not have the structure of a traditionally organized government. The highest
authority resides in the Ministerial Conference, which consists of all the member states. It
meets at least once every two years and makes the most important decisions about trade talks.
Below the Ministerial Conference stands the General Council, which operates the DSB,
responsible for resolving disputes between member states. World Trade Organization,
“Understanding the WTO: The Organization,” available at
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org2_e.htm (last visited May 11,
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disorienting array of references to dictionaries, alternate meanings, and definitions.
Some would argue that this is precisely the mandate of the AB: to find the exact
meaning of treaty terms and apply them narrowly to the facts of the case at issue.2
After all, doing anything more than interpreting the text would be judicial activism,
unacceptable in an international organization governed by treaty. But a growing
number of scholars have argued that the rigid textualism practiced by the AB is
counterproductive, in the sense that it conceals the rationales and methodologies that
underlie decisions and provides little guidance for member states in formulating trade
policies.3 These scholars argue that the AB’s refusal to articulate the more holistic
approach to treaty interpretation that any court must engage in does serious harm to
the AB’s reputation and legitimacy.4 Nevertheless, all sides agree that the AB has
clearly adopted narrow textualism as its presiding methodology of treaty
interpretation.
Before discussing the AB’s textualist jurisprudence, it would perhaps be
appropriate to specify the bounds of the argument. This paper understands textualism
as the view that judges should settle disputes by looking at the original meaning of
treaty provisions. More importantly, textualists argue that the original meaning of
treaty provisions must be determined by looking closely at the text.5 Textualist

2010). Under the terms of the Uruguay Round Agreement, a complaining party may request
the formation of a panel to determine whether another member state has violated the treaty.
The panel examines the matter and writes a report setting out its opinion on the dispute. If
one party disagrees with the panel’s conclusion, it may appeal the decision to the AB. The AB
has authority to affirm, reverse or modify the panel’s legal findings and conclusions. Both
panel and AB decisions must be adopted by the Dispute Settlement Body to have legal force,
but decisions are adopted according to the reverse consensus rule: unless there is a consensus
of member states to not adopt a decision, the decision will be adopted. Thus, the winning
party must also consent to not adopt a decision. Jeffrey L. Dunoff, Does the U.S. Support
International Tribunals? The Case of the Multilateral Trade System, in THE SWORD AND THE SCALES:
THE UNITED STATES AND INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 322, 345(Cesare
Romano ed., 2009).
2 See Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, Six Years on the Bench of the World Trade Court, in THE WTO
DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM 1995-2003, at 509 (Federico Ortino & Ernst-Ulrich
Petersmann eds., 2004).
3 See, e.g., Henrik Horn & Joseph H. H. Weiler, European Communities – Trade Description of
Sardines: Textualism and its Discontent, in THE WTO CASE LAW OF 2002: THE AMERICAN LAW
INSTITUTE REPORTERS’ STUDIES (Henrik Horn & Petros C. Mavroidis eds., 2005); Federico
Ortino, Treaty Interpretation and the WTO AB Report in US – Gambling: A Critique, 9 J. INT’L
ECON. L. 117 (2006); Daniel Tarullo, The Hidden Costs of International Dispute Settlement: WTO
Review of Domestic Anti-dumping Decisions, 34 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 109, 124 (2002).
4 Id. at 163-65.
5 For examples of textualist interpretation in the United States, see ROBERT H. BORK, THE
TEMPTING OF AMERICA (1990); Akhil Reed Amar, The Supreme Court: 1999 Term, Foreword: The
Document and the Doctrine, 114 HARV. L. REV. 26 (2000); Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B.
Prakash, The President’s Power to Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541 (1994). For a critical view of
textualism and the U.S. Constitution, see William Michael Treanor, Taking Text Too Seriously:
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proponents therefore focus their arguments on questions of grammar, word
placement, and dictionary definitions. Textualism stands in contrast to broader, more
holistic approaches to interpretation such as structuralism and developmentalism,
which take into account the underlying purpose that animates the document.6 This
purpose may be the promotion of certain values (such as equality, fairness and justice)
or certain processes (such as democratic decision-making or separation of powers).7
In any case, textualism elevates the language of the document above its animating
spirit.
The discussion should also be prefaced with a caveat. Criticism of a
methodology should not be equated with criticism of a result. A textualist approach
will often lead to a conclusion that is similar or identical to the conclusion that would
be reached using a structuralist or developmentalist approach. The important point
here is that textualism reaches this result in a different way. It arrives at its endpoint
by focusing almost exclusively on the text of the treaty, rather than by the drafter’s
intent or the purpose of the treaty as a whole. The methodology of WTO
jurisprudence is significant, because the methodology chosen will have a considerable
effect on a decision’s capacity to give guidance and structure decision-making in the
future.
To proceed with the analysis of WTO jurisprudence, then, there is almost
universal agreement among scholars that AB opinions are typified by narrow
textualism, by a focus on the words and structure of treaty provisions. The full extent
of the AB’s textualist approach may best be illustrated by a close reading of AB case
law. One particularly useful case is EC – Sardines,8 which involved a dispute between
Peru and the European Community (EC) over the labeling of sardines. A 1989 EC
regulation provided that only fish of the species sardina pilchardus could be labeled and
marketed as “sardines.” Peru, however, exported other kinds of fish, and in particular
sardinops sagax, which it desired to label as “sardines.” Peru sued the EC in the WTO,
claiming that the EC regulation violated the terms of the Technical Barriers to Trade
Agreement (TBT). Peru pointed to a non-binding international standard, the Codex
Alimentarius, which would allow sardinops sagax and other fish to be labeled as
sardines, as support for its argument. The AB agreed with Peru, holding that the EC

Modern Textualism, Original Meaning, and the Case of Amar’s Bill of Rights, 106 MICH. L. REV. 487
(2007).
6 Stephen Breyer is perhaps America’s most prominent structuralist. He argues that the
constitution should be interpreted so as to encourage popular participation in governmental
decisions. STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC
CONSTITUTION (2005). Former Chief Justice Earl Warren was long the most forceful advocate
of developmentalism, arguing that the constitution should be interpreted in light of “the
evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.” Trop v. Dulles, 356
U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
7 See JOHN H. GARVEY & T. ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF, MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY:
A READER 91–101 (1999).
8 Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Trade Description of Sardines,
WT/DS231/AB/R (Sept. 26, 2002).
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had indeed violated the TBT by failing to use relevant international standards as a
basis for its regulation.9
While the substance of the dispute was quite technical, involving the proper
designation of several genera of fish, the consequences of the decision were
momentous. For the first time, the AB had held that a technical regulation adopted by
a member state was invalid because it was not in conformity with an explicitly nonbinding international standard. The AB was, in effect, giving more binding force to an
international standard than that international standard itself purported to possess. The
EC had claimed that this standard should not bind them because the Codex
Alimentarius was not adopted by consensus, but the AB rejected this argument,
stating that even non-consensual agreements were relevant international standards.
The decision was a profoundly important development in international law.
But did the AB acknowledge the radical move it was making in the case? No.
Instead, it focused its opinion on self-evident interpretations of treaty text and
dictionary definitions. So, one of the first questions that the AB addressed was the
proper definition of a technical regulation. The text of the TBT stated that a technical
regulation was a “[d]ocument which lays down product characteristics or their related
processes and production methods, including the applicable administrative provisions,
with which compliance is mandatory.” The AB “interpreted” this provision to mean
that the document must (1) apply to an identifiable product, (2) lay down
characteristics of the product and (3) make compliance with the product
characteristics mandatory.10 The most casual glance at the “interpretation” here by the
AB will reveal that it bears a striking resemblance to the actual text itself. Indeed, it
would be hard to say that the AB’s interpretation was an interpretation at all, rather
than a regurgitation of the text of the treaty. The AB’s restatement does not provide
any further guidance to member states about the actual meaning of the text.
Another important section of the AB’s decision dealt with the question of
whether the EC had used the Codex Alimentarius as a basis for its regulation. The EC
claimed that it had used the standard as a basis for its regulation, arguing that “as a
basis” should be interpreted according to the basic structure of the text as a whole.11
The AB settled the matter by referring to the definition of “basis” in a variety of
dictionaries. First, the AB pointed out that Webster’s dictionary defines “basis” as
“the principal constituent of anything, the fundamental principle or theory, as of a
Article 2.4 of the TBT states:
Where technical regulations are required and relevant international standards exist or their
completion is imminent, Members shall use them, or the relevant parts of them, as a basis
for their technical regulations except when such international standards or relevant parts
would be an ineffective or inappropriate means for the fulfillment of the legitimate
objectives pursued, for instance because of fundamental climatic or geographical factors
or fundamental technological problems.
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade art. 2.4, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, Legal Instruments – Results of the
Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) (hereinafter TBT Agreement).
10 Id. ¶ 176.
11 Id. ¶ 241.
9
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system of knowledge.”12 Second, the AB stated that the New Shorter Oxford English
Dictionary provided further support by defining “basis” as “the main constituent”
and “[a] thing on which anything is constructed and by which its constitution or
operation is determined.”13 Finally, the AB stated, “From these various definitions, we
would highlight the similar terms ‘principal constituent’, ‘fundamental principle’,
‘main constituent’, and ‘determining principle’—all of which lend credence to the
conclusion that there must be a very strong and very close relationship between two
things in order to be able to say that one is ‘the basis for’ the other.”14 The AB
concluded this discussion by holding that the EC had not used the Codex
Alimentarius as a basis for its regulation.15
These reasoned arguments were essential parts of the AB’s conclusion that
domestic technical regulations must be consistent with even non-binding international
standards in order to satisfy the requirements of the WTO treaty. This profound shift
in the binding power of international law was arrived at through narrow textualist
reasoning.
A few characteristics of the particular WTO version of textualism stand out.
The AB begins with the text, “interprets” it by restating the text, and then uses this
interpretation to make a conclusion that was the very subject of dispute. Dictionary
definitions of seemingly obvious terms are used to arrive at controversial holdings.
The logic seems strained, as the AB jumps from self-evident statement to self-evident
statement, arriving finally at hugely consequential and controversial conclusions.
This is textualism run amok. Critics of WTO jurisprudence have highlighted
the failure of the AB to recognize the array of interests that are at issue and the
potential consequences for the system as a whole. 16 They explain this failure by
reference to the AB’s concern for its legitimacy and its belief that close textual
interpretation bestows greater authority on AB opinions.17 In other words, the AB has
decided to refrain from more expansive explanations of its driving theory of
interpretation because it fears that to do so would represent an overstepping of its
limited mandate, that of resolving member state disputes.
But a number of questions arise from this explanation. First, does textualism
provide the AB with more legitimacy? It is far from clear that obscuring the
foundational assumptions in an opinion gives the opinion more persuasive pull.
Second, does textualism do a better job at discovering the original meaning of treaty
provisions? Textualists often assume that close readings reliably capture original
meaning, but it might be that a more holistic analysis of the text would better realize
the intent of the contracting parties.18 Finally, does the AB have other reasons for
using a textualist approach? It might be that the AB has certain incentives to use a
Id. ¶ 243 (quoting WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY 117 (1976)).
Id. ¶ 244 (quoting 1 NEW SHORTER OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 188 (1993)).
14 Id. ¶ 245.
15 Id. ¶ 258.
16 Horn & Weiler, supra note 3; Ortino, supra note 3.
17 Horn & Weiler, supra note 3, at 6; Ortino, supra note 3, at 129.
18 See Treanor, supra note 5, at 490.
12
13
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textual rather than structural or development approach, incentives that inhere in the
nature of the WTO and international law in general. Could the AB be resisting the
drive to “constitutionalize” international law?19
In order to answer these questions, it is necessary to look at other aspects of
WTO jurisprudence of recent years. In particular, it will be useful to examine the
extent to which WTO decisions interfere with sensitive democratic processes within
the domestic sphere of member states.
B. Domestic Processes
A second line of criticism of WTO jurisprudence focuses on the interaction
between WTO disciplines and democracy.20 As the GATT has grown to include
treaties governing trade in services and health and safety measures, many scholars
have argued that AB decisions increasingly interfere with sensitive democratic
processes in sovereign countries.21 In this line of argument, the WTO’s jurisprudence
has tended to remove decision-making power from democratic majorities within
countries in issue areas that cut to the very heart of the idea of sovereignty. By
restricting a country’s ability to determine the level of health or safety risk that it finds
desirable, the AB’s opinions constrain popular will.
There are at least two responses to this criticism of WTO jurisprudence. The
first is to argue that AB opinions, by governing the process and methods by which
For a discussion of constitutionalization in international law, see Jeffrey L. Dunoff,
Constitutional Conceits: The WTO’s “Constitution” and the Discipline of International Law, 17 EUR. J.
INT’L L. 647 (2006); DEBORAH Z. CASS, THE CONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF THE WORLD
TRADE ORGANIZATION (2005); Robert Howse & Kalypso Nicolaidis, Enhancing WTO
Legitimacy: Constitutionalization or Global Subsidiarity?, 16 GOVERNANCE 73 (2003); John H.
Jackson, The Perils of Globalization and the World Trading System, 24 FORDHAM INT’L L. J. 371
(2000); JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: CONSTITUTION AND
JURISPRUDENCE (1998); John H. Jackson, The WTO “Constitution” and Proposed Reform: Seven
“Mantras” Revisited, 4 J. INT’L ECON. L. 67 (2001); Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Time for a United
Nations ‘Global Compact’ for Integrating Human Rights into the Law of Worldwide Organizations: Lessons
from European Integration, 13 EUR. J. INT’L L. 621 (2002); Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, The WTO
Constitution and the Millennium Round, in NEW DIRECTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF JOHN H. JACKSON 111 (Marco Bronckers & Reinhard Quick
eds., 2000).
20 CLAUDE E. BARFIELD, FREE TRADE, SOVEREIGNTY, DEMOCRACY: THE FUTURE OF THE
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION (2001); CASS, supra note 19; BRADLY J. CONDON,
ENVIRONMENTAL SOVEREIGNTY AND THE WTO: TRADE SANCTIONS AND INTERNATIONAL
LAW (2006); Gregory C. Shaffer, The World Trade Organization Under Challenge: Democracy and the
Law and Politics of the WTO’s Treatment of Trade and Environment Matters, 25 HARV. ENVTL. L.
REV. 1 (2001); Robert Howse, Democracy, Science, and Free Trade: Risk Regulation on Trial at the
World Trade Organization, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2329 (2000).
21 See Vern R. Walker, Keeping the WTO from Becoming the “World Trans-Science Organization”:
Scientific Uncertainty, Science Policy, and Factfinding in the Growth Hormones Dispute, 31 CORNELL
INT’L L.J. 251 (1998); David A. Wirth, The Role of Science in the Uruguay Round and NAFTA Trade
Disciplines, 27 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 817 (1994).
19
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health and safety measures may be adopted, improve, rather than defeat, democracy.
In other words, WTO disciplines should be “understood not as usurping legitimate
democratic choices for stricter regulations, but as enhancing the quality of rational
democratic deliberation about risk and its control.”22 If WTO opinions improve the
quality of information and participation, then they may actually contribute to
democratic decision-making and not undermine it.23
A second response to the democracy critique of WTO jurisprudence is that
constraining democracy is precisely the purpose of the WTO. The founding purpose
of the WTO was to liberalize trade. It accomplished this purpose by setting ground
rules for international trade, for example by categorizing duties, setting tariff limits,
and structuring trade talks. These rules would be undermined if democratic majorities
within member states could decide to “cheat” on their commitments. Seen in this
light, AB opinions constraining democratic decision-making in sensitive issue areas
are a positive development, one allowing the WTO to fulfill its founding purpose.
But wherever one stands on this issue, it is clear that real concerns exist about
the effect of WTO jurisprudence on democratic sovereignty. In recent years, AB
opinions have reached farther and farther into the state, interfering with executive and
legislative lawmaking. These moves have been controversial and have elicited signs of
disapproval from many parties. Again, case law may prove to be the best way to bring
to light the nature of AB jurisprudence in this area.
Japan – Apples is one of the more controversial cases of recent years
concerning a government’s health and safety measures.24 Japan – Apples involved a
dispute between the United States and Japan over a ban on the importation of certain
apples from the United States.25 Japan justified this prohibition as a measure to
prevent the introduction of fire blight, a disease that attacked a wide variety of fruits.26
The United States, on the other hand, argued that the measure was an unjustified
Howse, supra note 20, at 2330.
See Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Trade Policy as a Constitutional Problem. On the ‘Domestic Policy
Functions' of International Trade Rules, in 1 THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: CRITICAL
PERSPECTIVES ON THE WORLD ECONOMY 121-51 (Robert Howse ed., 1998).
24 Appellate Body Report, Japan – Measures Affecting the Importation of Apples, WT/DS245/AB/R,
(Nov. 26, 2003) [hereinafter Japan – Apples].
25 According to the United States, Japan’s prohibition included nine measures to prevent fire
blight, including a prohibition of imported apples from orchards where fire blight had been
detected, a requirement that export orchards be inspected three times yearly for fire blight, and
prohibition of imports from any orchard that was located within 500 meters of another
orchard in which fire blight had been detected. Id. ¶ 14 n.36.
26 The AB in Japan – Apples gives a useful description of the disease:
Fruits infected by fire blight exude bacterial ooze, or inoculum, which is transmitted
primarily through wind and/or rain and by insects or birds to open flowers on the same
or new host plants. E. amylovora bacteria multiply externally on the stigmas of these open
flowers and enter the plant by various openings. In addition to apple fruit, hosts of fire
blight include pears, quince, and loquats, as well as several garden plants. Scientific
evidence establishes, as the Panel found, that the risk of introduction and spread of fire
blight varies considerably according to the host plant.
Id. ¶ 8.
22
23
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quota that violated WTO provisions, and in particular the Agreement on the
Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS). The SPS Agreement
provided that health measures must be based on scientific principles and sufficient
scientific evidence, and that they could only be applied to the extent necessary to
protect plant life.27 The AB concluded that Japan’s measures lacked sufficient
scientific evidence and therefore were impermissible under the SPS Agreement. The
AB explained that the measure was “clearly disproportionate to the risk identified on
the basis of the scientific evidence available.”28
Thus, the AB in Japan – Apples examined a health and safety measure
implemented by a member state and struck it down on the basis that the scientific
evidence was insufficient to support it. This opinion represented another extremely
important shift in WTO jurisprudence. Traditionally, the WTO was understood to be
an organization whose purpose was to promote liberalized trade by prohibiting
discriminatory trade restrictions. Much of WTO jurisprudence focused on identifying
measures that discriminated against foreign products. As one noted commentator has
described it,
the underlying objective and rationale of Article III [concerning equal treatment
for domestic and foreign products] [is] [s]eparating those State measures which
are genuinely instituted to protect against risk to human, animals and plants from
those which, by design or otherwise, are there to protect domestic production
and cannot be justified in full or in part on legitimate SPS grounds.29
In other words, WTO jurisprudence aimed mainly at distinguishing between
protectionist measures, on the one hand, and genuine policy decisions, on the other.30
But in Japan – Apples, neither side argued that Japan’s measure was either
intentionally or de facto discriminatory against foreign products. On its face, this case
did not involve the kind of protectionist sentiments that the WTO had traditionally
considered its mandate. Instead, Japan – Apples involved a measure that Japan had
enacted to prevent the contamination of plants with fire blight, a destructive disease.
The United States argued not that the measure was intended to discriminate against
foreign products, but that the measure lacked a sufficient scientific basis. The AB,
then, was called upon to determine whether Japan’s restrictions were justified by the
scientific evidence. This was a tremendously important holding: states could violate
Agreement on the Application of Sanitary or Phytosanitary Measures art. 5.1, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex A(3)(a), Legal
Instruments – Results of the Uruguay Round 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1381 [hereinafter SPS
Agreement].
28 Japan – Apples, supra note 24, ¶ 163, citing Panel Report, Japan – Measures Affecting the
Importation of Apples, WT/DS245/R (July 15, 2003).
29 Damien J. Neven & J.H.H. Weiler, One Bad Apple?: A Comment on “Japan – Measures Affecting
the Importation of Apples – AB-2003-4,” in THE WTO CASE LAW OF 2003: THE AMERICAN LAW
INSTITUTE REPORTERS’ STUDIES (Henrik Horn & Petros C. Mavroidis eds., 2006).
30 See JOHN CROOME, RESHAPING THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: A HISTORY OF THE
URUGUAY ROUND 202 (2d ed. 1999).
27
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the WTO Agreement even when their measures had no discriminatory purpose. As
long as the measure lacked sufficient scientific justifications, it could be struck down.
Some might argue that assessing scientific evidence is outside the competence
of the AB.31 Others would defend that the text of the SPS Agreement requires some
sort of involvement by the AB.32 Both sides would agree, though, that the AB in Japan
– Apples and other cases has gone further and further down the road to making policy
judgments about the wisdom of national laws. In order to determine whether Japan
had violated its WTO commitments, the AB looked at the effectiveness of its
measures at preventing the risk of fire blight.
It is important to remember that the AB has insisted that members retain full
autonomy to set their own level of acceptable risk.33 It is perfectly acceptable for a
state to decide that it wants a lower threat of food-borne disease than other states
accept.34 At the same time, the SPS Agreement makes clear that member states must
have sufficient scientific evidence to justify their restrictions.35 Read together, these
requirements establish that member states may decide what level of risk they are
willing to accept, but once they set this level, they are required to choose measures
that are necessary to achieve the desired risk level. In other words, there must be
some sort of rational relationship between the desired risk level and the safety
measures adopted.

Id. at 22–26.
Id. at 10–22.
33 See, e.g., Appellate Body Report, Australia – Measures Affecting Importation of Salmon, ¶ 125,
WT/DS18/AB/R (Oct. 20, 1998), [hereinafter Australia – Salmon]; Appellate Body Report,
European Communities – Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products, WT/DS26/AB/R,
WT/DS48/AB/R (Jan. 16, 1998) [hereinafter Beef Hormone Report].
34 Id.
35 SPS Agreement, supra note 27. The relevant provisions are Articles 2.2, 5.1 and 5.7. Article
2.2 states:
Members shall ensure that any sanitary or phytosanitary measure is applied only to the
extent necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health, is based on scientific
principles and is not maintained without sufficient scientific evidence, except as provided
for in paragraph 7 of Article 5.
Article 5.7 states:
In cases where relevant scientific evidence is insufficient, a Member may provisionally
adopt sanitary or phytosanitary measures on the basis of available pertinent information,
including that from the relevant international organizations as well as from sanitary or
phytosanitary measures applied by other Members. In such circumstances, Members shall
seek to obtain the additional information necessary for a more objective assessment of
risk and review the sanitary or phytosanitary measure accordingly within a reasonable
period of time.
Article 5.1 states:
Members shall ensure that their sanitary or phytosanitary measures are based on an
assessment, as appropriate to the circumstances, of the risks to human, animal or plant
life or health, taking into account risk assessment techniques developed by the relevant
international organizations.
31
32
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At times, though, the AB has struggled to distinguish between a state’s
desired risk level and its measures chosen to enforce that level. In Japan – Apples, the
AB agreed with the Panel that Japan’s measures were inappropriate. According to the
AB, the risk of transmission of fire blight through a particular pathway was
“unlikely.”36 The AB does not, however, ever address what particular risk Japan had
decided to accept. Instead, the AB appears to have adopted the Panel’s approach of
assessing for itself what kind of measures were appropriate.
Issues of health and safety cut to the very heart of modern ideas of
sovereignty. Democratic communities take very seriously their judgments about how
best to protect the physical well-being of their citizens. The WTO’s jurisprudence,
however, has increasingly constrained the ability of governments to exercise their
discretion in this sensitive area. By assessing the adequacy of the connection between
a desired risk level and the measures adopted to achieve this level, the AB has come
closer and closer to a jurisprudence that looks something like policy judgment. What
is perhaps more worrying is the AB’s tendency to blur the line between assessing that
rational relationship with assessing the appropriateness of the risk level itself. As the
AB strengthens its scrutiny of state decisions about acceptable risk levels, it prevents
democracies from responding to the legitimate fears and concerns of its citizens.37
To the extent that this narrowing of democratic choice reduces the ability of
governments to adopt protectionist measures in response to domestic pressure, it may
be seen as a positive development. After all, the SPS Agreement’s primary purpose
was to allow measures genuinely aimed at protecting citizens from health risks while
banning measures adopted to protect domestic over foreign production.38 At the
same time, the critique that WTO jurisprudence somehow interferes with sensitive
domestic processes is a potent one. The democracy critique finds widespread support
in both the scholarly literature39 and public opinion.40 Again, though, critics and
proponents alike acknowledge that the AB has increasingly addressed issues that
reduce the ability of democratic governments to make sensitive policy decisions about
the welfare of citizens.
The democracy critique of WTO jurisprudence has been a long-running
debate in the literature. Another similarly controversial critique has focused on
compliance with AB decisions. In particular, the compliance critique argues that the

Japan – Apples, supra note 24, ¶ 77.
See Tim Büthe, The Globalization of Health and Safety Standards: Delegation of Regulatory Authority
in the SPS Agreement of the 1994 Agreement Establishing the Word Trade Organization, 71 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 219 (2008).
38 See Neven & Weiler, supra note 29.
39 See supra note 20. See also Bruce Silverglade, The WTO Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary
Measures: Weakening Food Safety Regulations to Facilitate Trade?, 55 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 517 (2000).
40 Public protests at WTO have become a regular occurrence. At the 2003 WTO summit in
Cancun, a South Korean citizen protesting against free trade committed suicide by stabbing
himself on top of a police barricade. His final words were, “WTO kills farmers.” The event
received major press coverage. See Sang-Hun Choe, Suicide Highlights Korean Farm Problems,
Associated Press, Sept. 22, 2003.
36
37
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AB’s decisions often lead to perverse results, by encouraging rather than reducing
protectionist measures. The next section will address this contentious issue.
C. Varieties of Compliance
If the basic purpose of the WTO is to liberalize trade by restricting the
imposition of trade barriers, one might expect that the WTO’s judicial organ would
develop a jurisprudence that encouraged trade-liberalizing measures. The AB, one
might plausibly predict, would want to accomplish this purpose by declaring traderestrictive measures incompatible with the WTO treaty and ordering their removal.
These predictions, however, could not be farther from reality. In fact, the AB’s
opinions frequently lead to the introduction of more, rather than less, trade-restrictive
measures in the violating country.41 The AB’s decisions encourage the erection of
trade barriers by imposing upon countries a choice in how to comply with an opinion:
either to remove the offending measure or to raise other measures to an equal level.
The structure of domestic politics tends to lead states to choose the more restrictive
measure as the solution.
Compliance levels with WTO DSB decisions are exceptionally high when
compared with other international tribunals.42 Losing parties comply with WTO
opinions an estimated 95% of the time. 43 This compared with a 61.9% compliance
rate at the International Court of Justice44 and a 5% compliance rate at the InterAmerican Court of Human Rights.45 Scholars often equate compliance rate with the
success of a tribunal.46 But in the case of the WTO court, it is important to note the
type of compliance that the AB demands.
In most cases, the AB recommends the losing party to “bring its measure . . .
into conformity with its obligations” under the WTO Agreement.47 While this may
See, e.g., Australia – Salmon, supra note 33 (after which Australia expanded its restrictions on
the importation of fish); Beef Hormone Report, supra note 33 (after which the EC continued to
have restrictions on the importation of beef injected with hormones); Appellate Body Report,
Brazil – Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres, WT/DS332/AB/R (Dec. 3, 2007)
[hereinafter Brazil – Tyres] (which instructed Brazil that it was discriminatory to permit the
importation of some tires but not others).
42 See Judith L. Goldstein & Richard H. Steinberg, Negotiate or Litigate? Effects of WTO Judicial
Delegation on U.S. Trade Politics, 71 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 257, 275 (2008); Laurence R.
Helfer, Why States Create International Tribunals: A Response to Professors Posner and Yoo, 93 CAL. L.
REV. 899 (2005); William J. Davey, The WTO Dispute Settlement System: The First Ten Years, 8 J.
INT’L ECON. L. 17, 50 (2005). But see Donald McRae, Measuring the Effectiveness of the WTO
Dispute Settlement System, 3 ASIAN J. WTO & INT’L HEALTH L. & POL’Y 1 (2008); Eric A.
Posner & John C. Yoo, Judicial Independence in International Tribunals, 93 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 27
(2005).
43 See Goldstein & Steinberg, supra note 42, at 275.
44 See Posner & Yoo, supra note 42, at 37.
45 Id. at 41.
46 Id.
47 See, e.g., Brazil – Tyres, supra note 41, ¶ 259.
41
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appear to be a firm order to the losing party, it actually gives member states
considerable flexibility in how to implement the AB’s recommendations. Take, for
example, the case of Brazil – Tyres.48 In this case, Brazil had banned the importation of
retreaded tires, a kind of recycled tire that had a shorter useful life than newly made
tires. Brazil justified the ban as necessary to protect its citizens from the threat of
disease, since discarded tires tended to accumulate and become breeding grounds for
disease.49 The EC sued Brazil at the WTO, alleging that the ban on tires was not
necessary to protect human life and health. They pointed to the fact that Brazil was
allowing the importation of retreaded tires from Mercosur states, but not other states.
The AB held that the ban, although provisionally justified as necessary to prevent the
risk of disease, violated the requirement that health and safety measures not
unjustifiably discriminate between countries.
Brazil, then, was faced with a stark choice. The AB’s opinion indicated that
the ban on importation of tires was improper because it arbitrarily discriminated
against some countries. In order to comply with the decision, Brazil could take two
tacks. First, it could remove the ban on importation of retreaded tires, thereby treating
Mercosur and non-Mercosur countries equally. Second, it could ban the importation
of retreaded tires from Mercosur countries as well as non-Mercosur countries. Either
option was perfectly acceptable under the AB’s formulation of Brazil’s obligations
under the treaty. In Brazil’s case, its membership in Mercosur required it to continue
to allow in retreaded tires from Mercosur members. But nothing in the AB’s opinion
prevented Brazil from raising restrictions on trade.
This is not an isolated problem. In general, the AB has opted to take a
permissive approach to its concluding recommendations. For the most part, it
requires states to bring their measures into compliance with the treaty, but allows
states great flexibility in how they do this. When cases involve “unjustifiable
discrimination” between states, the offending nation has a choice to either raise or
lower the barriers to trade. In some cases, states decide to raise those barriers.50 In
other cases, they decide to lower them. But in either case, the AB’s opinion plays a
limited role in affecting this ultimate decision.
This aspect of WTO jurisprudence is troubling if viewed from the
perspective of the aims and purposes of the organization as a whole. The WTO is a
system that is devoted to reducing barriers to trade. The DSB is the organ with
competence to enforce the terms of the treaty. But if the AB’s decisions allow states
to increase, rather than decrease, barriers to trade, it would appear to threaten the
effectiveness of the system as a whole. Indeed, some AB decisions appear to do just
this, giving member states the option of implementing further protective measures in
order to reduce discrimination between states.
The alternative, of course, is for the AB to take a more directive approach to
its rulings. Instead of giving states a choice between raising or lowering barriers to
trade, the AB might instruct a member state to remove the offending measure. This
Id.
Id. ¶ 56.
50 See discussion infra Part III.
48
49
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would ensure that the underlying purposes of the WTO treaty were accomplished by
directing the state to lower its barriers to trade.
On the other hand, when the AB has taken such a directive approach, it has
sometimes faced criticism.51 Some argue that the AB only has the authority explicitly
given to it in Article 19 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU), which
provides that “where a panel or the Appellate Body concludes that a measure is
inconsistent with a covered agreement, it shall recommend that the Member
concerned bring the measure into conformity with that agreement.”52 According to
this line of thought, the AB can only recommend that a member state bring its
measure into conformity with the agreement and cannot go further and recommend
that the member state remove the trade-restrictive measure.
But both the text and objective of the WTO treaty do not appear to prohibit
the AB from engaging in the kind of directive rulings that they have shied away from
in the past. Article 19 of the DSU provides that “[i]n addition to its
recommendations, the panel or Appellate Body may suggest ways in which the
Member concerned could implement the recommendations.”53 This language would
suggest that the AB may do more than just recommend that a member state bring its
measure into conformity with the treaty. It suggests that the AB has the power to
issue more specific recommendations about how the member state is to do so. This
interpretation is supported by basic principles of treaty interpretation. The Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties states that treaties shall be interpreted in
accordance with “the ordinary meaning” of the terms in light of the treaty’s “object
and purpose.”54 Given the WTO’s primary purpose of liberalizing trade, the claim
that the AB has the power to issue rulings that recommend the removal of an
offending measure finds some grounding in the applicable law.
This discussion has highlighted how the AB’s jurisprudence has paved the
way for member states to raise barriers to trade rather than lower them. By giving
states flexibility in deciding how to implement its recommendations, the AB has
opened the door to a raft of new protectionist measures. This problematic
jurisprudence has been a source of strife in recent years. Part of the problem inheres
in the nature of internal barriers to trade: if the treaty is attempting to do away with
discriminatory internal measures, then the discrimination may be gotten rid of by
lowering the protectionist measure or raising the liberal measure. But part of the
The AB’s decision in US – Anti-Dumping Act faced particular criticism. In that case, the AB
came close to requiring that the US remove the offending measure. The AB was accused of
setting a troubling precedent. Appellate Body Report, United States – Anti-Dumping Act of 1916,
WT/DS136/AB/R, WT/DS162/AB/R (Aug. 28, 2000). See Jeffrey S. Beckington, The World
Trade Organization’s Dispute Settlement Resolution in United States – Anti-Dumping Act of 1916, 34
VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 199 (2001).
52 See Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes art. 19,
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2,
Legal Texts – Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter DSU].
53 Id.
54 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31(1), May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 8
I.L.M. 679 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980).
51

2010 / WTO Jurisprudence & Its Critiques: Anti-Constitutional Resistance

137

problem stems from a conscious decision of the AB to refrain from giving
authoritative rulings about how a member state is to bring its measure into conformity
with the agreement. The above analysis shows that this decision is not explicitly
required by either the terms or objective of the treaty. Rather, it is a jurisprudential
choice.
The ultimate resolution of the choice is not an easy one. Difficult questions
arise for judges and scholars faced with the problem of how to fashion judicial orders.
First, it is not clear that states did not foresee this trade-restricting effect of AB
decisions when they were negotiating the Uruguay Round. It is at least possible that
the only way the Uruguay Round could succeed was to allow for the possibility that
states might continue problematic actions but require that they pay a price for clear
contraventions of the WTO agreements.55 If states truly did intend to impose this
troubled jurisprudence on the AB, then there is a strong argument that the AB should
continue to use a flexible approach to recommendations. Second, and perhaps more
importantly, it is an unsettled question how much judges should consider the
consequences of their holdings before making a decision. That is, some
commentators argue that judges should not shift how they decide because of how
they imagine parties to the decision will act in response to the decision.56 To do so
would be unacceptable judicial activism. These are difficult problems that courts must
deal with, but this article argues that they must be dealt with directly and forthrightly
given their profound consequences for the WTO regime.
At this point, then, it may be useful to give a concrete example of a case in
which all of the three major critiques of WTO jurisprudence are evident. Examples
abound, but a particularly apt case stems from a dispute over the importation of
salmon.
III. AUSTRALIA – SALMON AND WTO JURISPRUDENCE
Australia – Salmon is a case that exemplifies the three critiques of WTO
jurisprudence. The AB in the case adopted an extremely narrow, textual approach to
the dispute. Its analysis interfered with democratic processes involving sensitive
domestic issues. The final opinion also opened the door to an increase in trade
restrictive practices in the losing state, a door that the losing state promptly chose.
The case, therefore, shines a light on WTO jurisprudence that would be impossible to
replicate by looking at the aspects of AB law in isolation.

For a discussion of the difficulties of ratifying the Uruguay Round, see John H. Jackson, The
Great 1994 Sovereignty Debate: United States Acceptance and Implementation of the Uruguay Round
Results, 36 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 157 (1997).
56 William N. Eskridge, Jr., & Philip P. Frickey, An Historical and Critical Introduction to the Legal
Process, in HENRY M. HART, JR., & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS
IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW lxxix-lxxx (William N. Eskridge, Jr., & Philip P.
Frickey eds., 1994).
55
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A. Background

Australia’s waters teem with one of the most diverse populations of fish to be
found in the world today. Its geographical isolation from other countries, its long
coastline, and the incredible range of habitat types have all contributed to creating a
truly unique marine fauna.57 The Coral Triangle, located off the coast of Australia, has
been described as having “the greatest marine biological diversity on the planet” and
is home to seventy five percent of the world’s known coral species and more than
3,000 species of fish.58 The gross value of Australian fisheries production between
2006 and 2007 was a staggering $2.18 billion.59 The importance of the fishing industry
in Australia has led to strong concerns within the country about maintaining the
health and safety of fish species. In response to these concerns, in 1975 Australia
implemented a prohibition on the import of fresh, chilled or frozen salmon.60 The
Quarantine and Inspection Service justified the prohibition as necessary to prevent
the introduction of exotic diseases with the potential to damage the domestic salmon
industry.61
Just like Australia, Canada has a large and important fishing industry.
Exports of fish and seafood products amounted to more than $3.6 billion in 2009.62
Important exports include lobster, crabs, shrimp, herring, and, most relevantly,
Atlantic salmon.63 Salmon exports from British Columbia alone totaled $330.9

Gillett, Preston and Associates, Inc., Food and Agriculture Organization of the United
Nations [FAO], The Sustainable Contribution of Fisheries to Food Security in the Oceania, available at
http://www.fao.org/docrep/003/x6956e/x6956e09.htm (last visited Apr. 19, 2010).
58 Office of the Hon Peter Garrett MP (Austl.), Media Release: Minister and Northern Neighbors in
Solomon Islands to Advance Ocean Protection, Nov. 18, 2009, available at
http://www.environment.gov.au/minister/garrett/2009/mr20091118.html (last visited May
11, 2010).
59 Australian Bureau of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Australian Fisheries Statistics 2007
(June 2008), available at http://www.abareconomics.com/interactive/08afs_june/ (last visited
Apr. 19, 2010).
60 Quarantine Proclamation 86A (Feb. 19, 1975), reprinted in Panel Report, Australia – Measures
Affecting Importation of Salmon, ¶ 2.14, WT/DS18/R (June 12, 1998) [hereinafter Australia –
Salmon Panel Report]:
[Prohibiting] the importation into Australia of dead fish of the sub-order Salmonidae, or
any parts (other than semen or ova) of fish of that sub-order, in any form unless . . . prior
to importation into Australia the fish or parts of fish have been subject to such treatment
as in the opinion of the Director of Quarantine is likely to prevent the introduction of any
infectious or contagious disease, or disease or pest affecting persons, animals or plants.
61 See NATHALIE BERNASCONI-OSTERWALDER ET AL., ENVIRONMENT AND TRADE: A GUIDE
TO WTO JURISPRUDENCE 279 (2006).
62 Fisheries and Oceans Canada, News Release: Minister Shea Celebrates Strong Exports of Canadian
Fish and Seafood Products, Mar. 15, 2010, available at http://www.dfo-mpo.gc.ca/media/npresscommunique/2010/hq-ac10-eng.htm (last visited May 11, 2010).
63 Id.
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million in 2009.64 Canada has a long history of fiercely defending its fishing industry.
In the so-called “Fish War” of 1978, after a breakdown of negotiations over fishing
boundaries, Canada threatened to seize U.S. fishing vessels and their catches, and
potentially prosecute U.S. fishermen, if the fishermen did not leave Canada’s fishing
zone immediately.65 So, when Australia enacted its import ban on salmon, threatening
an important export market for Canadian salmon producers, Canada did not take the
measure lightly. Canadian authorities protested the ban vociferously and began
unofficial negotiations with Australia to solve the problem.66 After nearly twenty
years of unsuccessful negotiations, in 1994, Canada finally requested consultations
with Australia under the auspices of the GATT.67
The GATT consultations ended in an agreement that Australia would
conduct an import risk analysis on the dangers of importing wild Pacific salmon.68
The first draft of this report, released in May of 1995, concluded that importation of
salmon could be safely permitted under certain circumstances.69 The draft report,
thus, recommended that the importation of salmon from Canada and the United
States be permitted.70 This recommendation, however, met with fierce opposition
among the Australian public.71 In particular, Tasmanian fishermen protested that the
importation of North American salmon could be harmful to the domestic fish
industry.72
By the time the final import risk analysis was issued in 1996, Australian
authorities had reversed themselves. The final report identified up to 20 diseases that
might spread to Australia by the importation of Pacific salmon.73 Although the risk
that the diseases would be introduced to Australia was low, the economic impact of
such an occurrence would be immense, the report stated.74 The diseases would be
ineradicable and would threaten the very viability of the fishing industry.75 Given
these risks, the report concluded that the import ban on salmon should remain in
Fisheries and Oceans Canada, Backgrounder: Provincial and Territorial Breakdown of Canada’s Fish
and Seafood Exports in 2009, Mar. 2010, available at http://www.dfo-mpo.gc.ca/media/backfiche/2010/hq-ac10a-eng.htm (last visited May 11, 2010).
65 See Geoffrey Stevens, Don’t Laugh at the Cod War: A Fine Kettle of Fish--And Complex, Too,
THE GLOBE & MAIL (Can.), June 6, 1978.
66 See Office of the Minister for International Trade (Austl.), Government Seeks Input on Possible
Retaliation Against Australia (May 28, 1999), cited by Matthew D. Taylor, The WTO Panel Decision
on Australia’s Salmon Import Guidelines: Evidence that the SPS Agreement Can Effectively Protect Human
Health Interests, 9 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 473, 481 (2000); Bryan Mercurio, The Australian
Contribution to the Jurisprudence of the WTO Dispute Settlement Process, 12 Currents Int’l Trade L.J.
42, 45 (2003).
67 See Australia – Salmon Panel Report, supra note 60, ¶ 2.27; Taylor, supra note 66, at 481.
68 See Australia – Salmon Panel Report, supra note 60, ¶ 2.27.
69 See Cherry Ripe, Green at the Gills, WEEKEND AUSTRALIAN (Austl.), May 13, 1995.
70 See Australia – Salmon Panel Report, supra note 60, ¶ 2.28.
71 See Brian Toohey, Howard Has Bigger Fish to Fry, SUN HERALD (Sydney, Austl.), Sept. 8, 1996.
72 Id.
73 See Australia – Salmon Panel Report, supra note 60, ¶ 2.30.
74 Id.
75 Id.
64
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force.76 Some commentators suggested that this sudden reversal was motivated by
political considerations.77
Unsatisfied, Canada requested the formation of a WTO dispute settlement
panel to review Australia’s import ban on salmon in 1997. Canada alleged that the
import ban violated the SPS Agreement because it was not based on a risk
assessment.78 Article 5.1 of the SPS Agreement, it will be remembered, requires
member states to “ensure that their sanitary or phytosanitary measures are based on
an assessment, as appropriate to the circumstances, of the risks to human, animal or
plant life or health. . . .”79 Australia countered that its IRA was an appropriate risk
assessment for the purposes of the SPS Agreement and that the ban was necessary to
protect its diverse fisheries from exotic disease.80 Canada, in return, argued that its
salmon products for human consumption were not associated with the spread of
salmon diseases.81
The Panel’s report upheld the majority of the provisions of Australia’s import
ban. It found that Australia’s Import Risk Assessment was a proper risk assessment.82
Furthermore, the guidelines for salmon, as compared to those for other fish, were not
found to be disguised restrictions on trade.83 Canada, again unsatisfied with the result,
appealed the decision to the WTO’s AB.
B. AB Decision
On appeal, the AB reversed much of the Panel’s opinion, concluding that
Australia’s import ban was impermissible under the terms of the SPS Agreement.84 In
essence, the AB concluded that, because Australia allowed the import of other fish
that carried the same pathogens, the import ban on salmon was arbitrary or
unjustifiable. In other words, Australia imposed more severe trade restrictions on
products that posed a lower threat of the risk that Australia was purportedly worried
about. The decision rested on narrow textual analysis of the SPS Agreement, with
little consideration for the broader consequences of the decision.
The AB began its analysis by interpreting the SPS Agreement’s definition of
“risk assessment.”85 The text of the agreement defines risk assessment as “[t]he
evaluation of the likelihood of entry, establishment or spread of a pest or disease
within the territory of an importing Member according to the sanitary or
phytosanitary measures which might be applied, and of the associated potential
Id.
See, e.g., Toohey, supra note 71.
78 See id. ¶ 1.3.
79 SPS Agreement, supra note 27, at art. 5.1.
80 See Australia – Salmon Panel Report, supra note 60, ¶¶ 4.131-36.
81 Id. ¶¶ 4.67-70
82 Id. ¶ 7.71.
83 Id. ¶¶ 7.102-03, 7.107, 7.154-57.
84 Australia – Salmon, supra note 33.
85 Id. ¶ 120.
76
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biological and economic consequences. . . .”86 The AB, in its typical fashion,
“interpreted” the text to have an entirely self-evident meaning. According to the AB,
therefore, a risk assessment must:
(1) identify the diseases whose entry, establishment or spread a Member wants to
prevent within its territory, as well as the potential biological and economic
consequences associated with the entry, establishment or spread of these diseases;
(2) evaluate the likelihood of entry, establishment or spread of these diseases, as well
as the associated potential biological and economic consequences; and
(3) evaluate the likelihood of entry, establishment or spread of these diseases
according to the SPS measures which might be applied.87
The AB’s interpretation of the definition provided no further guidance as to the
potentially ambiguous meanings within the definition of risk assessment, but merely
restated the text itself.
The AB then moved on to clarifying what the text means by “likelihood.”
The AB analogized “likelihood” to “probability” and therefore cited a previous case
that had referred to the dictionary meaning of probability as “degrees of likelihood”
and “a thing that is judged likely to be true.”88 Using this definition, the AB concluded
that, in order for a risk assessment to satisfy the requirements of the SPS Agreement,
“it is not sufficient that a risk assessment conclude that there is a possibility of entry,
establishment or spread of diseases,” but “[a] proper risk assessment . . . must
evaluate the ‘likelihood’, i.e., the ‘probability’, of entry, establishment or spread of
diseases.”89
Applying its newly fashioned rule to the facts of Australia – Salmon, the AB
held that Australia’s risk assessment did not adequately evaluate the likelihood of
entry of disease. According to the AB, Australia’s risk assessment “on occasions,
results in general and vague statements of mere possibility of adverse effects
occurring,” and this finding resulted in a violation of the requirements of Article 5.1
of the SPS Agreement.90
The AB then went on to analyze whether Australia’s measure violated Article
5.5 of the SPS Agreement.91 Article 5.5 articulates the consistency principle of the SPS
Agreement, which requires member states to apply health and safety measures
Id.
Id. ¶ 121.
88 Id. ¶ 123, citing Beef Hormone Report, supra note 33.
89 Id. ¶ 123.
90 Id. ¶ 129.
91 Article 5.5 of the SPS Agreement, supra note 27, provides:
With the objective of achieving consistency in the application of the concept of
appropriate level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection against risks to human life or
health, or to animal and plant life or health, each Member shall avoid arbitrary or
unjustifiable distinctions in the levels it considers to be appropriate in different situations,
if such distinctions result in discrimination or a disguised restriction on international
trade.
86
87
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consistently across different areas. In other words, members must not use arbitrary or
unjustifiable distinctions in application of their health and safety measures. The AB
had previously set out a three-part test for determining whether a member had
violated Article 5.5: (1) the member must have adopted different appropriate levels of
risk in different situations, (2) those levels of protection must have arbitrary or
unjustifiable differences, and (3) the measure must result in discrimination or a
disguised restriction on international trade.92
The AB, applying its three-part test, found that the risk of disease from
salmon was actually lower than or equal to the risk from herring, cod, haddock and
other fish.93 Yet Australia did not impose a prohibition on the importation of these
other kinds of fish. The distinctions in treatment, therefore, were arbitrary and
unjustifiable.94 The AB concluded that the measure resulted in discrimination or a
disguised restriction on international trade, and thus that the measure violated Article
5.5 of the SPS Agreement.95
In the final paragraph of the opinion, the AB recommended that the DSB
request that Australia “bring its measure . . . into conformity with its obligations under
[the] Agreement.”96 The AB’s decision gave Australia some room to maneuver
because it did not recommend how precisely Australia was to comply with the
decision. Australia’s response would have severe repercussions for the entire WTO
system.
C. Aftermath
The AB had found Australia’s salmon import prohibition lacking because it
was not based on an adequate risk assessment and that it arbitrarily distinguished
between different kinds of fish that presented similar levels of risk. Australia, thus,
was faced with a choice. It could comply with the decision by lowering its restrictions
on the import of salmon, or it could comply by raising its restrictions on other types
of fish. In the end, it chose a combination of the two.
After a WTO arbitrator ordered Australia to modify its import ban, Australia
quickly conducted another Import Risk Analysis.97 This new risk analysis, completed
in 1999, considered the risk that a wide variety of fish would introduce exotic diseases
into Australian fisheries. Based on this new risk analysis, Australia issued revised
import guidelines for salmon and many other types of fish.98 The new guidelines
Australia – Salmon, supra note 33, ¶ 140, citing Beef Hormone Report, supra note 33.
Id. ¶ 154.
94 Id. ¶ 158.
95 Id. ¶ 178.
96 Id. ¶ 280.
97 Australian Quarantine & Inspection Service, Import Risk Analysis on Live Ornamental Finfish,
available at http://www.daff.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0018/16362/finalornamental.pdf
(last visited May 11, 2010).
98 Australian Quarantine & Inspection Service, Animal Quarantine Policy Memorandum 1999/51:
Final Reports of Import Risk Analyses on Non-viable Salmonid Products, Non-viable Marine Finfish
Products and Live Ornamental Finfish and Adoption of New Policies (July 19, 1999), available at
92
93
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removed the ban on the import of salmon, but included a complex permit system
before entry would be allowed. The guidelines also introduced certification and permit
requirements for non-salmon fish.
In the end analysis, then, Australia complied with the AB’s decision by
slightly lowering its restrictions on the import of salmon and significantly raising its
restrictions on the import of other types of fish. When Canada challenged this action
at the WTO, a compliance panel upheld the regulatory measures. According to the
Compliance Panel, the new risk assessment met the requirements of the SPS
Agreement, and the import restrictions did not operate as a disguised restriction on
international trade.99 Therefore, Australia’s import restrictions were WTO-compatible.
D. Discussion
As evident from the above description, Australia – Salmon is a case that
highlights all of the major critiques of WTO jurisprudence. The AB interprets the SPS
Agreement in a narrowly textual way that fails to give useful guidance to member
states. Its opinion interfered with sensitive democratic issues in a domestic state.
Finally, its decision opened the door to the imposition of new, higher trade
restrictions in the importing country. Even the briefest of overviews will show just
how significant these critiques are.
The AB in Australia – Salmon had to determine whether Australia’s
prohibition on the import of salmon was permitted under WTO disciplines. The AB
framed the question as, first, whether Australia’s risk assessment was consistent with
the SPS Agreement and, second, whether the import ban was a disguised restriction
on international trade. It concluded that Australia had failed both tests. There is
nothing strange about this result. There are many reasons why Australia’s measures
might be lacking. If a risk assessment is supposed to fairly assess the risk of disease
from a product, then one might say that Australia’s risk assessment was biased or that
it inaccurately put forward the relevant risks. If an import restriction must not be a
disguised restriction on trade, then one might argue that Australia’s measures were
motivated by the protectionist desires of certain domestic groups. But what is peculiar
about the AB’s decision is that it reaches its conclusion without addressing any of
these seemingly important questions.
Instead, the AB arrived at its conclusion using an extremely narrow, and at
times mind-boggling, parsing of the agreement’s text. It started with the definition of
risk assessment in the SPS Agreement, which states that a risk assessment evaluates
the likelihood of the entry of disease. It compared “likelihood” to “probability,” and
therefore cited a previous decision that defined probability by its dictionary definition
of “degrees of likelihood.” Purportedly having clarified the meaning of the text, the
AB looked at Australia’s recent risk assessment and concluded that, because the
http://www.daff.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0011/16022/99-051.pdf (last visited May 11,
2010).
99 Article 21.5 Panel Report, Australia – Measures Affecting Importation of Salmon, ¶¶ 7.42, 7.58,
7.71, WT/DS18/RW (Feb. 18, 2000).
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assessment “on occasions” used vague assertions about the possibilities of disease, the
risk assessment did not meet the requirements of the SPS Agreement.
The AB’s analysis of whether Australia’s import ban on salmon was a
disguised restraint on trade was similarly unhelpful. It began by looking at the text of
the SPS Agreement, which provided that members must “avoid arbitrary or
unjustifiable distinctions in the levels it considers to be appropriate in different
situations, if such distinctions result in discrimination or a disguised restriction on
international trade.”100 It glossed over the many ambiguities inherent in the wording
and focused on the fact that Australia put higher restrictions on salmon than other
fish, when those other fish posed similar risks of introducing disease to Australian
fisheries. This, the AB found, was evidence that Australia’s measure was arbitrary and
unjustified, and, therefore, that it resulted in discrimination or a disguised restriction
on international trade.
One understanding of the ruling might be that the AB effectively concluded,
without saying so, that piecemeal efforts to combat health or safety risks were
impermissible under the SPS Agreement. In other words, if a country desires to
protect against a risk of disease, it must enact a comprehensive regulation of any
factors that might introduce such a disease. A regulation that arbitrarily singles out
only one element of the risk for special treatment would be unacceptable, in this view.
Another understanding might be that the AB thought that Australia’s import ban was
motivated by a desire to protect powerful domestic interests. Under this
understanding, if a country’s regulations are motivated by protectionist impulses,
those regulations must be struck down, even if they are neutral on their face. Either if
these possible rulings would have profound repercussions for the entire WTO system.
But the AB’s strictly textual analysis does not discuss any of the potential
consequences of its interpretation, and it leaves member states unsure of how to
proceed.
The AB’s ruling also interfered with sensitive democratic processes in a
sovereign country. Australia adopted its import restrictions after concerned citizens
became alarmed at the threat that imported salmon could pose to their domestic
fisheries.101 Regional governments feared that the importation of Canadian fish could
bring exotic diseases that would devastate the local populations of fish.102 Citizen
groups and regional governments put pressure on the Australian government to
prohibit the import of salmon in order to prevent serious harm to local species, and
they were ultimately successful in this effort.103
By overturning this result, the AB raised a highly important question about
democracy and legitimacy. The ability to protect the health and safety of humans,
animals, and plants stands at the very core of sovereign rights. While the removal of
tariffs and quotas is often considered more trade-like and therefore legitimate for the
WTO to engage in, the removal of health and safety measures strikes at one of the
SPS Agreement, supra note 27, at art. 5.5.
J. McCallum, Salmon Import Disease Alarm, HERALD SUN (Melbourne, Austl.), July 7, 1995.
102 M.H. Moore, Fish Import Move Not On, MERCURY (Hobart, Austl.), May 27, 1995.
103 Id.
100
101
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most basic powers of a government, the protection of the security and well-being of
its citizens. The point here is not that the AB improperly read the SPS Agreement.
The SPS Agreement assuredly limits the ability of governments to adopt health and
safety measures. What is significant about the decision is the strictness with which the
AB scrutinized the scientific basis for these measures. The AB’s decision to declare
the measures invalid rested, not on a claim of discrimination or protectionist intent,
but rather on a claim that the scientific basis for the measures was “insufficient.” Such
an overly invasive review is neither required by the SPS Agreement nor prudent, given
that weighing scientific evidence is likely outside the AB’s field of expertise. More
importantly, this kind of searching analysis of democratic decisions interferes
increasingly with domestic rights of states.
Finally, the AB’s decision in Australia – Salmon led perversely to higher, not
lower, trade restrictions in the violating state. The AB’s holding focused on the fact
that Australia had improperly discriminated between salmon and other kinds of fish
that presented the same type of risks. In its recommendation, the AB stated that
Australia should bring its measures into conformity with the agreement. The
recommendation, however, had the potential of leading to further trade restrictions,
as Australia could eliminate discrimination either by lowering restrictions on salmon
or raising restrictions on other fish. Australia decided to do both.
This choice is paradoxical when seen from the point of view of the WTO’s
animating purpose. The GATT and the WTO were envisioned as world trade bodies
that would improve individual welfare by reducing barriers to trade. But the AB’s
decisions in Australia – Salmon and other cases permit precisely the opposite result,
that is, the raising of trade barriers. This paradox in WTO jurisprudence is in part
inherent in all discrimination cases. After all, if the problem is disparate treatment, the
solution is to treat different products alike. Generally, it presents member states with a
choice of raising or lowering tariffs. Yet there is nothing in the WTO Agreement that
obligates the AB to take such a hands-off approach to its recommendations. The AB
could recommend that a member state remove the offending barrier. This would
ensure that member states that violated WTO disciplines would be required to lower
rather than raise trade barriers. But the AB has refused to engage in such a directive
approach to its rulings. Instead, it has given member states wide leeway in fashioning
methods to remedy past treaty violations.
IV. WTO HISTORY AS EXPLANATION
The above discussion has highlighted three major critiques of WTO
jurisprudence. First, AB decisions have adopted a narrowly textual approach to
interpreting and applying treaty provisions, an approach that has obscured the ability
of past decisions to give guidance to member states. Second, AB decisions have
increasingly interfered in sensitive democratic processes that cut to the very heart of
ideas of sovereignty. Third, AB decisions have opened the door to the possibility of
increasing trade restrictions by allowing member states to bring their measures into
conformity with the treaty in any way possible. It is important to note that the
argument is not that AB decisions have been wrong. Instead, the point is that these
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controversial areas of WTO jurisprudence have been more or less voluntary choices
of the AB. Nothing in the text of the agreement requires the AB to engage in the kind
of decision-making highlighted above.
If these characteristics of WTO jurisprudence have been so controversial,
why did the AB choose to take the path it chose? This section will argue that the AB’s
jurisprudence has sprung from the unique position of the WTO DSB. Occupying an
awkward position in between diplomacy and law, the DSB has been torn between its
duties to both. On the one hand, the AB has demonstrated that it is acutely aware that
it was originally conceived as a means for states to settle disputes diplomatically and
quickly, and that any overreaching by the court would imperil the very existence of
the WTO. On the other hand, the AB has attempted to maintain its commitment to
impartial interpretation and application of the law. To some extent, these two
commitments of the AB have been complementary: an unbiased court that impartially
interprets the terms of the treaty may be the best means for states to settle their
disputes diplomatically. But the nature of WTO jurisprudence has clearly been
distorted by a certain vision of law that stems from the hybrid nature of the WTO, in
general, and the AB, in particular. WTO jurisprudence demonstrates a fierce
resistance towards constitutionalization, as understood as the effort to remove or
channel world trade politics.104 In order to maintain its legitimacy in the eyes of
member states, the AB has adopted a narrowly textual approach to treaty
interpretation, an approach that may appear more palatable to member states. But as
the above description of WTO jurisprudence makes clear, this textual approach has
actually led to perverse and undesirable results. Thus, this section also argues that the
AB has consciously chosen to avoid constitutionalization in order to increase its
legitimacy as a hybrid diplomatic-legal institution, but that this effort ultimately has
failed.
A. The WTO’s Origins in GATT
In order to understand the development of WTO jurisprudence, a brief
survey of the history of the WTO is necessary.105 This history is one of a fragile
organization (originally the GATT) birthed in the period after World War II,
struggling to fulfill its ambitious goals with only a skeletal institutional infrastructure.
It was only after many decades that it reached the point today where it is arguably the
most successful international organization in the world.106
After World War II, the major powers of the world came together to decide
See infra Part V.
For a more comprehensive history of the origins of the WTO in the GATT, see JOHN H.
JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: LAW AND POLICY OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
RELATIONS 31–43 (2d ed. 1997); DOUGLAS A. IRWIN ET AL., THE GENESIS OF THE GATT 98
(2008); KENNETH DAM, THE GATT: LAW AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE ORGANIZATION
(1970).
106 Guy de Jonquieres, Poorer Countries are Likely to be the Biggest Losers from the Unexpected
Breakdown in the Doha Round, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 16, 2003, at 21.
104
105
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on the future international system. This foundational period saw the formation of the
United Nations, the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund, all
organizations whose purposes were intimately connected with world peace and
economic prosperity. A fourth organization was also foreseen: the International Trade
Organization (ITO).107 The ITO was to improve economic welfare by liberalizing
trade, in particular by reducing tariffs and other trade barriers.108 The GATT was
intended as a temporary agreement that would allow member states to implement the
tariff reductions agreed upon during the ITO negotiations.109 But when negotiations
over the ITO fell apart, GATT, a provisional organization expected only to survive a
few years, became a permanent post-war institution.
The essential problem arose from GATT’s skeletal institutional
infrastructure. GATT did not come equipped to become a powerhouse international
organization that could structure and encourage widespread trade liberalization.
Instead, it was a consensus-based organization that required unanimous support for
any progress to be made. In particular, the dispute settlement system was weak and
not particularly judicial. For example, GATT’s unanimity requirement allowed a losing
party to block the adoption of an adverse panel report, regardless of the views of
other members, thereby avoiding an adverse judgment.110 This perplexing feature of
GATT’s dispute settlement body greatly diminished the dispute settlement panels’
capacity to engage in the kind of searching judicial inquiry normally seen in domestic
courts. After all, if a panel’s decision was unacceptable to the losing party, the losing
party could block its adoption.
In response to this perceived vulnerability, GATT panels developed a type of
conservative interpretive approach aimed at reducing any risk of “judicial activism.”
Their narrow textualist jurisprudence attempted to adhere strictly to the text of the
treaty. In doing so, panel members purported to eschew the imposition of individual
biases or ideologies and rely entirely upon the agreement between the parties. This
narrow textual jurisprudence is evident in all dispute settlement opinions during this
period. The turn to textualism is unsurprising, given the weak and unformed nature of
the GATT. Judges that exercise powers without explicit textual authority raise serious
concerns for the legitimacy of the court in the eyes of the member states.111 When
even the GATT itself was struggling to establish its place in the world, the GATT
panels occupied an especially precarious position.
See The GATT years: from Havana to Marrakesh, Understanding the WTO: Basics, available at
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact4_e.htm (last visited June 20,
2010).
108 Id.
109 Id.
110
David Palmeter & Gregory J. Spak, Resolving Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Disputes:
Defining GATT’s Role in an Era of Increasing Conflict, 24 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 1145, 1146
(1993).
111 See Cesare Romano, The Shift from the Consensual to the Compulsory Paradigm in International
Adjudication: Elements for a Theory of Consent, 39 NYU J. INT'L L. & POL. 791, 800 (2007);
Caroline Henckels, Overcoming Jurisdictional Isolationism at the WTO-FTA Nexus: A Potential
Approach for the WTO, 19 EUR. J. INT’L L. 571, 596 (2008).
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Over time, though, the GATT gained power and legitimacy as world trade
expanded and tariffs fell in the post-world war period. As tariffs and quotas fell,
countries began to look for other means to protect domestic industries from
competition, and internal barriers to trade (such as health and safety measures, and
regulatory standards) became more prevalent. These new barriers to trade brought
into stark relief all the weaknesses of the GATT system, and, in 1995, GATT’s
members created the WTO. The WTO had a more fleshed out institutional structure,
which included the removal of the requirement of consensus decision-making that
had hobbled the GATT. It also incorporated a range of agreements aimed at
regulating the proliferating international barriers to trade that threatened trade
liberalization efforts. These agreements included the Sanitary and Phytosanitary
Measures Agreement112 – which regulated health and safety measures – and the
Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement113 – which governed domestic regulations,
standards and certification procedures. With the conclusion of the WTO Agreement,
then, GATT became an entirely different organization with significantly more power
and legitimacy in the eyes of its members.114
With the expansion of the WTO’s powers, the AB was called upon to assume
a greater role than its GATT predecessor in resolving disputes in an ever-growing
number of issue areas. At the same time, the AB’s jurisprudential approach remained
as textual and strict constructionist as before. The AB’s decisions reflected the same
sort of narrow-minded devotion to the text of the treaty that had typified the GATT
era. The AB continued to avoid articulating a wider, more holistic understanding of
the treaty, its structure and its purposes.
The strict textualist jurisprudence of the AB had perhaps unexpected
consequences in the new era of the WTO. The expanding array of WTO disciplines
complicated previously straightforward conflicts. When disputes had involved solely
tariff issues, the AB simply needed to determine whether a tariff existed and whether
it violated the member state’s commitments. A recommendation that the losing party
“bring [a] measure into conformity with [the] agreement”115 led to a single conclusion:
the party must remove the tariff. But in the new regime of the WTO, the agreement’s
text required much more of the parties. The SPS Agreement restricted the ability of
states to adopt health and safety measures and set out the scientific conditions that
would permit such measures. The treaty also provided for a much more robust
discrimination norm, that is, that member states must have consistent treatment of
comparable products.
The combination of the AB’s textualism and the expanded powers of the
WTO resulted in the AB’s taking a much more active role than the GATT panels had
in previous years. The text of the SPS Agreement says that member states must base
SPS Agreement, supra note 27.
TBT Agreement, supra note 9.
114 See Howse & Nicolaidis, Enhancing WTO Legitimacy, supra note 19; Jo Weiler, The Rule of
Lawyers and the Ethos of Diplomats: Reflections on the International and External Legitimacy of WTO
Dispute Settlement, 35 J. WORLD TRADE 191, 201 (2001).
115 DSU, supra note 52, at art. 19.
112
113
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health and safety measures on a risk assessment that meets certain scientific standards.
A domestic court might take a more conservative approach to the problem of judicial
review by adopting a doctrine of deference to the legislature. Or it might decide to
adopt a strict scrutiny test, setting out the precise conditions under which a
legislature’s regulation will pass muster under the law. But the AB’s narrow textualism
has taken these jurisprudential standards off the table. Because the treaty does not talk
about deference or strict scrutiny, the AB has refused to adopt any such doctrines.116
Instead, the AB reads the language of the treaty to require it to determine, in the first
instance, whether the scientific evidence is sufficient to support a trade restriction.
One might think that the AB is the entity with the least ability to determine the
adequacy of scientific evidence, but the AB has read the text in a strict way that
requires such a conclusion.
Likewise, the AB’s reading of its mandate has limited its ability to fulfill its
primary purpose: ensuring the proper functioning of the trade liberalization regime.
Article 19 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding states that “where a panel or the
AB concludes that a measure is inconsistent with a covered agreement, it shall
recommend that the Member concerned bring the measure into conformity with that
agreement.”117 When the GATT regulated mainly tariffs and quotas, a panel’s order
that a member bring its measures into conformity with the agreement had a
predictable result: the lowering of trade restrictions. But in a WTO that has much
more complicated disciplines, the same vague and open-ended ruling can lead to
paradoxical results. As seen in the Australia – Salmon case, “bringing a measure into
conformity” can just as easily mean raising a trade barrier as lowering a trade barrier.
A more fully developed jurisprudence that would recognize the AB’s role as an
integral part of the system might lead to different results.
The AB’s retreat to formalism as a mechanism for legitimacy has ironically
exacerbated the tensions that it originally sought to avoid. The AB cannot avoid the
politics and its approach seems at times disingenuous. The retreat to formalism
appears even more hypocritical when one considers that AB members are often
chosen not for their legal acumen, but for political reasons.118 At the same time, it is
perhaps unsurprising that the AB has adopted a strict textualist approach. The
approach attempts to hew closely to the precise terms of the WTO Agreement. On
the surface, it would also give the appearance of not engaging in politics, thereby
making the decisions more palatable to important member countries. Finally, strict
Some scholars have argued that the WTO treaty does establish a doctrine of deference to
member states’ reasonable interpretations of treaty interpretations. See Roger Alford, The WTO
Appellate Body and International Judicial Deference, OPINIO JURIS (Aug. 28, 2006), available at
http://opiniojuris.org/2006/08/28/the-wto-appellate-body-and-international-judicialdeference/ (last visited Apr. 19, 2010).
117 DSU, supra note 52, at art. 19.
118 AB members must be “individuals with recognized standing in the field of law and
international trade, not affiliated with any government.” World Trade Organization,
Information and Media Relations Division, Understanding the WTO 61 (3d ed. 2005), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/understanding_text_e.pdf (last visited
Apr. 19, 2010). In practice, this requirement has been interpreted loosely.
116
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textualism could conceivably accommodate the varying legal traditions of the WTO
member countries more easily than a more open-ended judicial process would. After
all, it may be easier for AB members to agree on dictionary definitions than on
concepts requiring inference and politics.
This brief overview of the creation of the GATT and its transformation into
the WTO is not meant to give a comprehensive understanding of the AB’s role
throughout the history of the organization. Hopefully, however, it does give a better
explanation of how the WTO’s steadily increasing importance and power has shifted
and distorted the AB’s jurisprudence. A textualist approach meant to recognize the
WTO’s awkward position somewhere between diplomacy and law has led to
progressively more activist and controversial opinions. The next section will attempt
to place this jurisprudence in the context of the larger debate about the
constitutionalization of the WTO.
V. CONSTITUTIONALIZATION IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW
One of the fiercest debates in international trade scholarship in recent years
has raged over the so-called “constitution” of the WTO.119 Some debate its
characteristics,120 while others dispute its very existence.121 The debate has received
such attention because it has profound implications for the ongoing legitimacy and
strength of the WTO. The discussion takes place within the broader context of a
move towards constitutionalization of international law in general; for example, in
regimes like the European Court of Human Rights and the International Court of
Justice.
Jeffrey Dunoff, a prominent international trade scholar, has identified three
strands running through the different conceptions of WTO constitutionalism.122
These conceptions differ in the way they view the purpose and function of the WTO
constitution, but they share one key characteristic: they all assert that the WTO should
be properly understood as a constitutional entity. They tend to agree that this
constitutionalization serves to remove or channel the role of politics in world trade.123
One school of thought sees the WTO’s constitution as “institutional
architecture.”124 Typified by the works of John Jackson, this strand of scholarship
focuses on the institutional design of the WTO.125 Jackson argues that the purpose of
See Dunoff, supra note 19; Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Judging Judges: From ‘Principal-Agent
Theory’ to ‘Constitutional Justice’ in Multilevel ‘Judicial Governance’ of Economic Cooperation Among
Citizens, 11 J. INT’L ECON. L. 827 (2008); Joel P. Trachtman, The Constitutions of the WTO, 17
EUR. J. INT’L L. 3 (2006).
120 See CASS, supra note 19; JACKSON, supra note 19; Petersmann, supra note 19.
121 See Dunoff, supra note 19.
122
See id. at 651-56 (discussing the three strands of constitutionalism).
123 Id.
124 See id. at 651-53.
125 See JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION CONSTITUTION AND
JURISPRUDENCE (1998); John H. Jackson, The Birth of the GATT-MTN System: A Constitutional
Appraisal, 12 L. & POL. INT’L BUS. 21 (1980); JACKSON, WTO “CONSTITUTION” AND
119
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the WTO is “to give measured scope for legitimate national policy goals while
preventing the use of these goals to promote particular interests at the expense of the
greater common welfare.”126 In order to achieve this goal, “[w]hat is needed is an
institution” because “[i]n the long run, it may well be the machinery that is most
important . . . rather than the existence of any one or another specific rule of trade
conduct.”127 Jackson argues that the WTO can only provide the security and
predictability necessary for efficient markets if it adopts a constitutional rule-oriented
approach, as opposed to a power-oriented one.128
Another prominent strand of scholarship understands constitutionalism as a
set of normative commitments.129 Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, one of the most
important proponents of this view, thus argues that the WTO’s constitution protects
a core of fundamental normative values, including the rule of law, separation of
powers, and individual freedom.130 By recognizing and protecting these values, the
constitution prevents them from being overridden by “tyrannies of the majority.”
This limitation may actually increase the democratic nature of the organization. As
Petersmann puts it, “[t]he self-limitation of our freedom of action by rules and the
self-imposition of institutional constraints . . . are rational responses designed to
protect us against future risks of our own passions and imperfect rationality.”131
Finally, another line of scholarship understands constitutionalism in
international trade law to mean the mediating and norm-generating nature of WTO
dispute settlement.132 Deborah Cass, an exemplar of this approach, argues that the AB
“is the dynamic force behind constitution-building by virtue of its capacity to generate
constitutional norms and structures during dispute resolution.”133 Cass sees in the
jurisprudence of the AB a concern with the same kinds of issues that constitutional
courts face: “questions about the division of powers; . . . [of] state sovereignty . . .
PROPOSED REFORM, supra note 19. JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION
CONSTITUTION AND JURISPRUDENCE (1998); John H. Jackson, The Birth of the GATT-MTN
System: A Constitutional Appraisal, 12 L. & POL. INT’L BUS. 21 (1980); JACKSON, WTO
“CONSTITUTION” AND PROPOSED REFORM, supra note 19.
126 JOHN H. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT 788 (1969), cited by Dunoff,
supra note 19, at 652 n.14.
127 Id.
128 See JOHN H. JACKSON, RESTRUCTURING THE GATT SYSTEM 52 (1990), cited by Dunoff,
supra note 19, at 625 n.17.
129
See Dunoff, supra note 19, at 653-54.
130 See Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Constitutionalism and International Organizations, 17 Nw. J. Int’l L.
& Bus. 398, 431 (1996); Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, How to Reform the UN System:
Constitutionalism, International law, and International Organizations, 10 Leiden J. Int’l L. 421, 427
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[questions] about how a legal system is constituted, its overall validity, its democratic
contours, its very legitimacy.”134 In reaching decisions about these matters, the AB “is
beginning to develop a set of rules and principles which share some of the
characteristics of constitutional law; and . . . this in turn is what contributes to the
constitutionalization of international trade law.”135
These three views of constitutionalism at the WTO share the essential
conclusion that the WTO is properly understood as a constitutional entity. At the
same time, they differ dramatically in the way they view the structure and purpose of
the WTO’s constitution. Jackson’s approach highlights the institutional design of the
WTO’s constitution and posits that the constitution serves to efficiently resolve
disputes between states. Petersmann’s conception of constitutionalism understands
the constitution as a set of normative commitments to values such as individual
freedom and the rule of law. Cass’s approach focuses on the role of the judiciary in
gradually constructing a package of constitutional norms through dispute resolution.
But the turn to constitutional analogies in analyzing the WTO has not been
met with universal approval. Jeffrey Dunoff, in particular, has criticized the scholarly
emphasis on constitutionalization in the WTO.136 Dunoff argues that the conception
of the WTO as a constitutional polity is bereft of any factual support: “There is no
constitutional court, no constitutional convention, no constitutional drafting process,
and no readily identifiable constitutional moment.”137 Instead, the turn to
constitutionalism in the scholarly literature is an attempt to withdraw “controversial
and potentially destabilizing issues from the parry and thrust of ordinary politics.”138
This attempt is ultimately unsuccessful, Dunoff suggests, because the elevation of
trade law into the realm of constitutions sparks, rather than resolves, contestation and
controversy in world politics.139
Precisely the same sort of dynamic is present in the jurisprudence of the AB.
The WTO’s court has been concerned with its legitimacy in the eyes of the member
states from the very beginnings of the GATT. Occupying an awkward position at the
intersection of diplomacy and law, the AB has had to navigate a difficult route
between establishing a reputation for expert, impartial dispute resolution and
satisfying the underlying interests of states. This paper argues that the WTO’s
jurisprudence can be usefully explained as a product of this tension. The turn to
narrow, textualist interpretations of treaty law is an effort to resist the potentially
divisive constitutionalism movement. But, in a paradoxical reversal of Dunoff’s
argument, the resistance of constitutionalism in the WTO has sparked precisely the
kinds of controversy and contestation that the AB sought to prevent. The dogged
pursuit of narrow textualism at the expense of underlying legal principles has led to
increasingly contentious assertions of judicial power. Due to the progressively more
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complex and comprehensive nature of WTO disciplines, “conservative” AB opinions
have actually interfered with sensitive democratic processes involving the health and
safety of states’ citizens. At the same time, the AB has opened the door to rising
restrictions to trade by adopting flexible, rather than directive, rulings.
This article assumes that the fierce criticism of AB decisions is not
disingenuous. At least some commentators, however, have argued that the
controversy surrounding WTO AB decisions is in reality rather contrived.140
According to this view, the WTO serves as a kind of whipping boy for contentious
political decisions. States that do not want to confront powerful interest groups bring
suit at the WTO in order to appear to be vigorously pursuing all avenues of redress.
Even if the state knows that a case is a loser, it will pursue it in order to gain political
cover. One potential example of this is the United States Trade Representative and
the Kodak – Fuji case,141 which was initiated at the behest of the powerful Kodak
Company in the United States even though it appeared to be a losing case.142
Whatever the merits of this argument, though, there still appear to be many
commentators who have criticized the AB’s jurisprudence for all the reasons outlined
above. To dismiss these critiques as merely hot air is to ignore their very real causes
and consequences.
Thus, the WTO’s jurisprudence may best be understood as a resistance to
constitutionalization within an international organization. The AB has developed an
interpretative approach that hews closely to the text of the treaty with little reference
to its context or structure, in conscious repudiation of constitutional understandings
of the treaty. This approach may be criticized for its tautologies or its lack of
circumspection, but it was forged in response to the necessities of international law.
The WTO was purportedly a legal entity, but it faced all the constraints of operating
in a world still dominated by power politics. In the GATT era, this deferential
approach to decision-making worked well, allowing for diplomatic resolution of
disputes. But with the creation of the WTO and the concomitant expansion of the
AB’s mandate, the AB’s jurisprudence increasingly exacerbated the contestation and
controversy that it had so long sought to avoid.
VI. CONCLUSION
What does this mean for the AB, and the WTO more generally? Modern
trade dispute resolution was created inside an organization, the GATT, that faced
severe limitations due to its so-called “birth defects.” In order to overcome the
problems presented by diplomacy and law, GATT panels developed a jurisprudence
that relied almost entirely on a strict textualist analysis. This approach may have
served it well during the pre-WTO period, but when the WTO came into existence in
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1995, the AB’s continuation of its predecessor’s approach formed new problems. The
textual jurisprudence began to reach increasingly problematic results, including an
invasive scrutiny of democratic policies and a tendency to open to the door to the
erection of trade barriers. While the AB’s treaty interpretation was initially intended to
reduce contestation and politics in world trade, its resistance to constitutionalization
actually created the kind of controversy that it had sought to avoid. The criticism of
AB jurisprudence has raised profound questions about the continued relevance and
legitimacy of the WTO as a whole.
Thus, the AB stands at a crossroad. It may continue its work as “business as
usual,” using narrow textualism and dictionary definitions to reach its results. Or it
may strike out a new path, recognizing the legal doctrines and ideologies that underlie
its decisions. This choice will not be easy, but it must nonetheless be made openly and
honestly.
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